| THE
BOLIVIAN RESEARCH REVIEW
THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE BOLIVIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1
July, 2001
CONTENTS:
Same
Space, Different Dreams:
Bolivia's Quest for a Pacific Port
Ronald Bruce St. John
Abstract: Competing interests
in Bolivia, Chile and Peru have enjoyed vastly different
dreams for the same space in the Atacama Desert for much
of the last two centuries. Throughout this time, the issue
has remained largely tripartite in nature and centered
around the region now occupied by the Chilean port of
Arica. Despite multiple attempts, the issue of a Pacific
port for Bolivia remains unresolved to this day. Modern
concepts of frontiers, coupled with regional growth strategies
in the Bolivia-Chile-Peru tripoint, now appear to offer
fresh opportunities to address Bolivia's quest for a Pacific
port.
For much of the last two centuries, elements
of both consistency and change have characterized the
dispute in the Atacama Desert between the states of Bolivia,
Chile and Peru. Central elements of the dispute and any
likely settlement have remained unchanged even as the
character and content of the issue have evolved through
several stages. Today, the dispute remains tripartite
in nature and centered on the region around the Chilean
port of Arica. At the same time, the context of the dispute
is changing as Bolivia, Chile, and Peru look for ways
to promote economic development in the tripoint region
where their borders meet. This evolution appears to offer
new opportunities for Bolivia to fulfill its cherished
ambition for improved access to the Pacific Ocean.1
Background to the Dispute
After Bolivia declared independence in
August 1825, Simón Bolívar designated Cobija, a small
port located between the Loa and Salado Rivers, as Bolivia's
Pacific seaport.2 Although Cobija had functioned
historically as a minor customs control point for the
Potosi silver trade, the Bolivian government immediately
judged it inadequate for its primary port on the Pacific
due to its distance from the altiplano and the
existence of traditional routes of commerce running through
Peru to the Peruvian port of Arica.3 Concluding
that an alternate port facility was essential to the economic
development of Bolivia, if not for its survival as a viable
economic unit, Bolivian officials soon initiated the first
of many attempts to persuade Peru to transfer the port
of Arica to Bolivia.4
The early diplomatic initiatives of Bolivia
were soon rewarded as the Peruvian government on 15 November
1826 ceded to Bolivia the Pacific littoral south of the
Sama Valley from the 18th to the 21st
parallels and including the port of Arica. The two governments
at the same time concluded a pact affirming a Bolivian
Federation; however, the Peruvian congress subsequently
refused to ratify either agreement. Peruvian rejection
of the 1826 treaties later proved to be a watershed event
in the Atacama Desert dispute as this was the first and
last time that Peru would agree to cede Arica to Bolivia.5
Abortive attempts to secure Arica plagued
Bolivian diplomacy for much of the next six decades. During
the First Expedition of Restoration in 1837, Chilean officials,
in an effort to garner Argentine support for Chilean opposition
to the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, were willing to support
Argentina's claim to Tarija. In turn, Bolivia would be
compensated with part of the Peruvian department of Arequipa
so that Bolivia might obtain an adequate seaport. This
was the first time that Chile sounded a policy that would
surface again and again in Chilean diplomacy, i.e., the
solution to Bolivian problems through the appropriation
of Peruvian territory. After a Bolivian force occupied
Arica in December 1841, the first and only time Bolivia
was ever to occupy Arica, the Bolivian government offered
to buy the port from Peru going so far as to solicit a
British guarantee in the event of outside intervention.
A British refusal to provide the requested guarantees,
coupled with Peru's refusal to sell Arica, eventually
frustrated this Bolivian initiative. The subsequent Bolivian
retreat from Arica marked the end of any real chance that
Arica would be incorporated into Bolivia.6
Some two decades later, Chile offered
to assist Bolivia in the appropriation of the Peruvian
provinces of Tacna and Arica if Bolivia would then renounce
its claims to the territory between the coastal settlements
of Paposo and Mejillones or even as far north as the Loa
River. The Bolivian government eventually rejected this
Chilean proposal; however, its terms proved highly significant
as an accurate reflection of Chile's ambitions in the
littoral. By this time, Bolivian aspirations for improved
access to the Pacific had become so intertwined with the
growing rivalry between Chile and Peru that it was impossible
to conceive of a solution amenable to Bolivia that did
not also involve the direct interests of its neighbors
in the Atacama. In short, Bolivia's quest for a Pacific
port had become by the mid-1860's a trilateral issue,
and it would remain one into the 21st century.7
In the build-up to the War of the Pacific,
the Chilean government continued its efforts to detach
Bolivia from Peru by exploiting the former's deep-felt
need for an adequate Pacific outlet. On at least two separate
occasions in 1879, for example, Chile proposed to Bolivia
agreements in which Bolivia would grant Chile sovereignty
over the littoral between the 23rd and 24th
parallels in return for Chilean assistance in helping
Bolivia obtain improved access to the Pacific. Chilean
officials later renewed their efforts to detach Bolivia
from Peru when they assured their Bolivian counterparts
during the October 1880 Arica Conference that the bases
for peace offered in 1879 were still available.8
In the October 1883 Treaty of Ancón,
which marked the end of the War of the Pacific, Peru ceded
to Chile unconditionally and in perpetuity the littoral
province of Tarapacá and accepted Chilean occupation of
the provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of 10 years
after which time a plebiscite was to be held to determine
permanent ownership. Chilean ownership of Tarapacá effectively
precluded Bolivia regaining its littoral as Chile could
not be expected to return to Bolivia territory that would
separate Tarapacá from the remainder of Chile. In negotiations
which opened in December 1883, Bolivia pressured Chile
to grant it access to the Pacific in the form of a corridor
through Chilean territory or by cession to Bolivia of
the occupied Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica. The
Chilean government, responding that it could hardly cede
Tacna and Arica since it did not own them, also refused
to compromise its own territorial continuity by granting
a corridor to Bolivia.9
In May 1895, representatives of Bolivia
and Chile concluded three related agreements. The first
was a treaty of peace in which Bolivia, in exchange for
Chilean assumption of certain Bolivian financial obligations,
recognized Chilean sovereignty over the Bolivian littoral.
The second was a commercial agreement that combined a
reciprocal trade agreement with mutual guarantees for
the protection of nationals. The third pact included a
secret commitment on the part of Chile to transfer Tacna
and Arica to Bolivia if it acquired these Peruvian provinces
through a plebiscite or direct negotiations. If Chile
was unable to acquire them, it agreed to transfer to Bolivia
sovereignty over the zone from the Cove of Vitor to the
Valley of Camarones, an area in the southern part of the
province of Arica and thus not then legally a part of
Chile. In subsequent agreements concluded in December
1895 and April 1896, Bolivia and Chile agreed that the
May 1895 agreements constituted an integral and indivisible
accord. In the end, this package of agreements did not
come into force because they did not receive the requisite
parliamentary approval; nevertheless, they raised a storm
of protest in Peru. The Peruvian government responded
that it would never renounce its intention to regain Tacna
and Arica and vowed not to cede any part of its territory
to Bolivia, Chile or a third country.10
In the final peace settlement, eventually
concluded in October 1904, Bolivia ceded to Chile in perpetuity
the former Bolivian littoral, including the ports of Mejillones,
Cobija, Tocopilla, and Antofagasta. In return, Chile guaranteed
Bolivia commercial transit rights through Chile together
with facilities at selected Chilean ports, notably Arica
and Antofagasta, and promised to build a railroad from
the port of Arica to La Paz. The agreement ratified the
failure of Bolivian foreign policy after 1879 as the centerpiece
of that policy had been the attainment of a suitable port
on the Pacific Ocean. The terms of the 1904 treaty left
Bolivia landlocked, curtailed its economic development
and threatened its national security since the agreement
left all Bolivian lifelines to the sea in the hands of
its neighbors. Even more important, ratification of the
treaty decimated Bolivia's legal case and reduced it after
1904 to voicing extra-legal arguments in support of its
quest for a Pacific port.11
The governments of Chile and Peru, in
June 1929, concluded the Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional
Protocol. The terms of the agreement divided the Peruvian
provinces long occupied by Chile with Tacna going to Peru
and Arica to Chile. The government in Santiago also granted
Peru a wharf, customs office, and railway station at Arica
Bay as well as agreeing to pay Peru a $6 million indemnity.
In terms of Bolivian aspirations for a Pacific port, the
most significant proviso was article 1 of the additional
protocol which stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru
could cede to a third state any of the territories over
which they were granted sovereignty in the 1929 treaty
without the prior agreement of the other signatory. The
pact also provided that neither signatory could build
new international railway lines across those territories
without the approval of the other. Together, these provisions
effectively checkmated any future Bolivian policy designed
to play Chile or Peru off against the other in order to
gain an outlet to the sea.12
Responding to the Tacna and Arica Treaty
and Additional Protocol, the Bolivian government directed
a circular to its overseas legations in 1929 protesting
the terms of the agreement, especially the contents of
article 1 of the additional protocol. Thereafter, a cross
section of political movements in Bolivia continued to
articulate the need for improved access to the Pacific,
and most informed Bolivians agreed on the need for a sovereign
outlet. Unfortunately, there was little consensus among
Bolivians as to where it should be located or how best
to obtain it. Moreover, Bolivian options narrowed considerably
after 1936 when the Bolivian government concluded a nonaggression
treaty with Peru that prohibited intervention in the internal
or external affairs of the signatories. In the agreement,
Bolivia traded a guarantee of free transit of goods for
a declaration that it had no political or territorial
problems with Peru.13
Compensation, Ports and Water Rights
The Bolivian government, seeking to revive
the issue of a Pacific port since the end of World War
II, proposed to Chile in June 1950, based on a proposition
originating in 1948, direct negotiations aimed at granting
Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific. The Chilean government
agreed to discuss the issue; but in its formal response,
it raised the issue of compensation and emphasized that
under the terms of the 1929 agreements it was obliged
to consult with Peru.14 Little progress was
made after this initial exchange of notes. The Bolivian
government later tied its interest in a seaport to an
outstanding dispute with Chile over the use of the waters
of the Lauca River. When Bolivia learned that Chile intended
in late 1961 to begin an experimental diversion of the
headwaters of the Lauca, it strongly protested Chilean
policy, eventually breaking diplomatic relations with
Chile in 1962. Representatives of Bolivia and Chile engaged
in confidential talks in 1971 that reportedly were on
the verge of resolving the issue when the government in
La Paz was overthrown and the talks were suspended. The
Foreign Minister of Chile, Orlando Letelier, later commented
on 14 June 1973 that Chile alone could not address Bolivian
needs because the issue was a tripartite problem. The
Foreign Minister of Peru, Miguel Angel de la Flor Valle,
responded on 23 June 1973 with an expression of sympathy
for the aspirations of Bolivia in what may well have been
the first time since 1929 that Peru had done so in an
official statement.15
Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez
met with Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in March 1974
during inauguration ceremonies in Brasilia for the new
Brazilian president. President Banzer, upon his return
to La Paz, immediately organized a conference of Bolivian
leaders in Cochabamba to review and discuss all outstanding
issues with Chile. The product of this meeting was the
so-called Act of Cochabamba that identified the question
of a seaport on the Pacific as the national issue of greatest
importance to all Bolivians. In an effort to develop a
national consensus on the issue, Banzer then established
a Maritime Commission, composed of Bolivian authorities,
to study the question of improved access to the Pacific.
While the work of the commission encompassed many meetings
over long months, one of its first decisions was that
any proposed solution should be tripartite, including
Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. If that proved impossible, Peru
should be informed of any pending proposal simultaneously
with its presentation to Chile. The commission also agreed
that any proposed solution to the issue of a seaport for
Bolivia should take into account the regional interests
and desires of southern Peru, western Bolivia, and northern
Chile. In the course of its work, the commission also
concluded that any proposed solution should not involve
territorial compensation on the part of Bolivia. Finally,
it recognized that a seaport for Bolivia was only one
aspect of broader issues, including tariff regimes and
the free transit of goods, that would have to be discussed
in a total solution to Bolivia's maritime question.16
As the Maritime Commission continued
its work, Presidents Banzer and Pinochet again met on
8 February 1975 in a railway car northeast of Arica on
the Bolivia-Chile border. To the surprise of many observers,
the Act of Charaña issued at the end of these talks declared
an immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, ties
that had been severed since 1962 when Chile had moved
unilaterally to divert the headwaters of the Lauca River.
Based on the work of the Maritime Commission, the Bolivian
government on 26 August 1975 presented a formal proposal
in the form of an Ayuda Memoria to the Chilean
government. The key elements of the Bolivian proposal
were a sovereign coastline between the Linea de la Concordia
and the city of Arica with a strip of sovereign land connecting
the coastline and the Bolivia-Chile frontier and including
the transfer of the Arica-La Paz railway. It also provided
for the cession of a land corridor 50km long and 15km
wide in a zone to be determined near Iquique, Antofagasta,
or Pisagua. The proposal contained three other points,
two of which referred to infrastructure in the ceded area
and the third to Bolivian willingness to consider the
reciprocal interests of both parties. The Bolivian proposal,
on the other hand, did not include the word compensation
or refer directly to a need or desire to compensate Chile
for a Bolivian seaport on the Pacific.17
The Chilean government responded to the
Bolivian Ayuda Memoria in a formal diplomatic note,
dated 19 December 1975, in which it offered to exchange
a narrow land-sea corridor north of Arica along the Peruvian
border in return for equivalent compensation in the Bolivian
altiplano. Incorporating the principle of territorial
exchange, this aspect of the 1975 proposal marked a throwback
to the solution proposed by Chile in 1950. The land-sea
corridor proposed by Chile in 1975 extended 200 miles
into the sea; however, the shoreline waters at this point
were not sufficiently deep to accommodate most oceangoing
vessels. More to the point, Chile demanded territorial
compensation equal in area to both the land corridor and
the 200 mile extension into territorial waters. In so
doing, the Chilean proposal appeared to establish, or
at least seek to establish, a new precedent in international
law, the concept that land and sea space are comparable
in value.
The Chilean proposal also called for
Bolivia to renounce all claims to territory lost in the
War of the Pacific and to grant Chile exclusive rights
to the headwaters of the Lauca River, the issue that had
resulted in the break in diplomatic relations 13 years
earlier. In addition, Chile sought up to $200 million
in compensation for the cession of the Arica-La Paz railway,
and the demilitarization of the proposed corridor along
the Chile-Peru border. Since the corridor included the
territorial sea, the Chilean proposal would have left
the Bolivian navy without a military function in the Pacific.
The Bolivian government rejected the Chilean offer on
the grounds Bolivia should not have to make territorial
concessions elsewhere to obtain territory seized in an
aggressive war.18
The Peruvian government, made aware of
the Bolivia-Chile talks through the formal consultations
with Chile called for in the 1929 treaty as well as through
informal talks with Bolivia, launched a new initiative
in November 1976 in the form of a tripartite formula.
Peruvian officials called for creation of a zone of joint
Bolivia-Chile-Peru sovereignty between the city of Arica
and the Peruvian border with Bolivia granted a corridor
feeding into this zone.19 The Peruvian initiative
offered Bolivia almost as much as the Chilean proposal
without calling for territorial exchange, and it reintroduced
the issue of Peruvian rights in the disputed zone. With
a call for trinational development of the disputed territory,
the approach of Peru reflected a renewed emphasis in Lima
on Andean cooperation and development; and at the same
time, it highlighted the trilateral character of the dispute.
Chile later rejected the Peruvian initiative on the grounds
it introduced issues unrelated to the question at hand,
infringed on Chilean sovereignty, and threatened modifications
to the 1929 treaty.20
With negotiations seemingly stalemated,
the Bolivian government on Christmas day 1976 rejected
in principle Chilean demands for territorial compensation
together with the Peruvian proposal for trilateral occupation.
After yet another year of inconclusive talks, the Bolivian
government again severed diplomatic relations with Chile
in March 1978 on the grounds that territorial exchange
was not a subject for negotiation. Bolivian diplomacy
at the time appeared motivated in part by the growing
international isolation of the Pinochet regime due to
its human rights record in general and its refusal to
cooperate with the United States in a suspected case of
political assassination in particular.21
The Charaña talks, even though they produced
no concrete results, were noteworthy because in them all
three parties recognized the tripartite nature of the
issue. In addition, Bolivia received formal recognition
from both Chile and Peru of its right to coastal territory
although the proposals of its neighbors were widely different
in approach and content. The talks also suggested that
Bolivia was better placed to negotiate with Chile if the
two states had formal diplomatic ties although this was
clearly no guarantee of success. Finally, Bolivian consideration
of compensation as early as 1910, followed by Chilean
insistence on compensation after 1950, suggested that
Bolivia would eventually have to reconsider its opposition
to compensation if it hoped to improve its access to the
Pacific.22
Representatives of Bolivia and Chile
joined other Latin American delegations in Caracas in
May 1983 to celebrate the bicentennial birth of Simón
Bolívar. During the meeting, the Bolivian delegation articulated
a policy of unity and solidarity aimed at generating support
throughout the hemisphere for economic development and
a multilateral approach to the seaport issue. The president
of Colombia, a few months later, volunteered his country
as a venue for talks between Bolivia and Chile aimed at
reconsidering Bolivia's maritime problem. In this same
time frame, Bolivia also presented its case for a seaport
to the Andean Bloc, La Plata grouping of countries, Organization
of American States, United Nations, and Non-aligned Movement.23
The Peruvian government of Alan García
after 1985 explored different paths to improved diplomatic
relations with its neighbors in general and Bolivia in
particular. Peruvian Foreign Minister Allan Wagner travelled
to La Paz soon after taking office to discuss improved
commercial relations together with joint efforts to control
the narcotics traffic. Initially, the García administration
acknowledged Bolivia's perpetual concern, improved access
to the Pacific, but viewed it as a bilateral Bolivia-Chile
issue. The Bolivian government also departed at this time
from the multilateral strategy it had been pursuing for
almost a decade to open bilateral talks with Chile. In
April 1987, the foreign ministers of Bolivia and Chile,
Guillermo Bedregal Gutiérrez and Jaime del Valle, opened
talks in Montevideo that led to a fresh, if not new, Bolivian
initiative. The Bolivian government in mid-April 1987
proposed that Chile grant to Bolivia a corridor to the
sea north of Arica together with an enclave at Pisagua,
Tocopilla, or Mejillones. The Chilean government rejected
the Bolivian initiative in early June 1987 without making
a counterproposal.24 Peruvian President García
later suggested to his Bolivian counterpart that Peru
was prepared to accept Chilean cession to Bolivia of land
occupied by Chile during the War of the Pacific. But the
Bolivian government was unable to take advantage of this
apparent shift in Peruvian policy before the García administration
was replaced by that of Alberto Fujimori.25
Newly elected Bolivian President Jaime
Paz Zamora emphasized in his August 1989 inaugural address
that only a coastline could mitigate the enormous economic
and geographical obstacles Bolivia faced both as a landlocked
country and one facing what he described as a constrictive
geopolitical encirclement by its neighbors. In a creative
overture, he called for the application of a 21st
century mentality to the maritime question, an approach
that would combine the best elements of all earlier bilateral
and multilateral proposals. The Bolivian government then
launched a broad diplomatic initiative to familiarize
the international community with its aims. Addressing
the United Nations General Assembly in March 1990, President
Paz Zamora reaffirmed the basic Bolivian position that
Bolivia could not and would not renounce its intent to
recover its condition as a maritime nation. Thereafter,
the Bolivian government continued to call for a new mentality
to assist it in finding an innovative solution to the
problem; however, this hectic round of diplomatic activity,
while very effective in communicating Bolivian policy
to a wider audience, left relations with Chile unchanged.26
Bilateral Talks
The governments of Bolivia and Peru,
in early 1992, concluded a 50-year renewable agreement
permitting the former to establish customs and shipping
operations in a duty-free port and industrial park in
the Peruvian port of Ilo situated some 1,260 kilometers
south of Lima and 460 kilometers west of La Paz. In addition,
Peru ceded to Bolivia a tourist zone for 99 years together
with 5 kilometers of Ilo coastline. The coastal strip
was immediately baptized "Playa Boliviamar." In return,
Peru received similar facilities at Puerto Suarez on the
Paraguay River at the border with Brazil to promote Peruvian
trade with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. The agreement
also included a loan from the Inter-American Development
Bank for infrastructure development at Ilo port as well
as road construction and improvement on the roadways linking
the port to Bolivian territory.
While both governments hailed the pact
as an historic agreement that would promote regional development,
Bolivia was quick to add the event marked only a new step
in its determination to recover full rights to the Pacific
Ocean. In turn, the Peruvian government emphasized the
need, while respecting existing international agreements,
to seek creative, pragmatic solutions to difficult problems.
The governments of Bolivia and Peru later concluded additional
agreements intended to promote economic development in
the region as well as improved use of the free zone and
port at Ilo. However, none of the rights obtained by Bolivia
in the Ilo agreements implied any transfer of sovereignty.
All of the customs, duty-free, and port facilities covered
under the agreement remained under the sovereignty of
Peru and subject to its laws.27
Concurrent with its negotiations with
Bolivia, the Peruvian government continued an ongoing
dialogue with Chile aimed at full implementation of the
terms of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol. These
talks centered on three separate but related articles
in the 1929 agreements. Article 5 of the treaty called
for Chile to construct at Arica for Peru a landing stage
for steamships, a customs office, and a terminal station
for the Tacna railway as well as to provide Peru free
access to these facilities. Article 7 of the treaty called
on both Chile and Peru to respect private rights legally
acquired in the territories remaining under their respective
sovereignties, including the right of Peru to the Tacna-Arica
Railway Company. Article 2 of the additional protocol
called for Peru to enjoy complete freedom of transit for
persons, merchandise, and armaments to and from Peruvian
territory once the port facilities called for in Article
5 had been constructed. Even though Chile agreed in a
convention negotiated in the mid-1980s to turn over a
dock in Arica it had constructed for Peru, as well as
granting to Peru the right to us the Tacna-Arica railway,
the question of complete freedom of transit on the railway
to the pier remained contentious.28
Following a resumption of talks in January
1993 aimed at resolving all pending issues related to
the 1929 treaties, Chile and Peru concluded agreements
in May 1993, generally referred to as the Lima Conventions,
that appeared to resolve the final issues blocking full
implementation of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol.
Unfortunately, outward appearances once again proved deceptive.
Less than two years later, the foreign ministers of Chile
and Peru announced jointly that the 1993 Lima Conventions
were being set aside as they were no longer appropriate
to negotiations between the Chile and Peru. Instead, the
parties agreed to pursue a "practical and concrete formula"
related to the facilities provided for in the 1929 agreements.
Over the next four years, with Peru preoccupied with its
border dispute with Ecuador, little progress was made
on this issue.29
The Bolivian government was also unable
to achieve sustained progress in its peripatetic talks
with Chile. The Chilean government did announce in early
1993 that President Patricio Aylwin had instructed his
foreign minister to resolve all outstanding border disputes
before the end of the year. Expectations that this announcement
might signal a breakthrough in negotiations with Bolivia
were soon dashed, however, when Chile clarified its position
with an additional statement that it had no outstanding
border disputes with Bolivia or Peru. The Chilean government
suspended commercial negotiations with Bolivia a few days
later after high-ranking Bolivian military officers criticized
the talks on the grounds that Bolivia should not have
to subordinate its lofty national maritime interests to
the conclusion of a commercial agreement with Chile. Earlier,
the Bolivian government had won a vote of confidence from
the Bolivian congress to conclude a supplemental economic
agreement and, if possible, to resume diplomatic ties
with Chile.30
Over the next few years, the Bolivian
administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada thoroughly
explored a wide variety of policy options internally as
well as in confidential talks with representatives of
the Chilean government. Given Chilean reluctance to discuss
a sovereign Bolivian outlet to the Pacific, dialogue centered
on the challenges of globalization to both Bolivia and
Chile, reestablishment of diplomatic relations within
the context of a broader strategic relationship, and the
negotiation of a new bilateral treaty which, similar to
the Charaña talks, approached the maritime issue from
a nontraditional direction. In regards to the latter,
some consensus seemed to develop in Bolivian circles that
a comprehensive new treaty should include port concessions
at Arica and elsewhere similar to those obtained by Peru
in the Lima Conventions in 1993 and by Bolivia at Ilo
in 1992 albeit not at the sacrifice of a sovereign port
on the Pacific. There was also much discussion about the
need for a free trade agreement that liberalized bilateral
trade as well as a more liberal transit regime building
on the principles contained in the 1904 treaty as well
as in conventions concluded in 1912 and 1937 and a declaration
made in 1953. One of the more innovative proposals articulated
at the time called for the creation of a Binational Corporation,
drawing on public and private resources, to investigate
scientifically maritime issues and resources.
Concurrent with these activities, Bolivian
diplomats continued to press, with little positive result,
their position on the maritime issue in a variety of international
forums. When Foreign Minister Antonio Araníbar Quiroga
raised the subject in June 1994 at the XXIV meeting of
the General Assembly of the Organization of American states,
for example, his Chilean counterpart responded with an
uncompromising statement emphasizing that the question
of a Bolivian seaport on the Pacific died with the negotiation
of the 1904 treaty of peace. He added that today the position
of Chile rested on the principle of nonintervention and
the sanctity of treaties. Foreign Minister Araníbar continued
to raise the issue over the next few years, but there
was little sign of movement in the Chilean position. At
the XXVII meeting of the OAS general assembly in June
1997, Araníbar expressed frustration with what he characterized
as the inflexible position of the Chilean government.
At the same time, he stated emphatically that the Bolivian
government would never alter the vision or focus of its
maritime theme. The Foreign Minister of Chile, José Miguel
Insulza, responded in part that there was no pending issue
of territorial limits between Bolivia and Chile. He added
that the Organization of American States, in any case,
was not empowered to address questions related to the
sovereignty of member states. In the end, little was accomplished
at this point in the negotiations because neither party
could find a way to bridge Bolivia's demand for sovereign
access to the Pacific with Chile's refusal to concede
sovereignty.31
At the end of the Sánchez de Lozada administration,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia under the direction
of Foreign Minister Antonio Araníbar Quiroga, completed
in July 1997 a disciplined and detailed analysis of its
strategic relationship with Chile designed in part as
a guide for the incoming administration of Hugo Banzer
Suárez. Placing the maritime issue within the context
of globalization, the report envisioned a future partnership
with Chile that would overcome the conflicts of the past
yet assure Bolivia a sovereign presence on the Pacific.
To achieve this vision, the report called for joint action
that moved bilateral relations with Chile from a pattern
of conflict, confrontation and frustration to one of cooperation,
sustained confidence, friendship and common interests.
In so doing, the report recognized fully the importance
of regional and continental development in the contemporary
world economy.
To remake its relationship with Chile,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined in this significant
policy statement four separate but interrelated strategic
imperatives. First, Bolivia must reestablish its maritime
presence (reinserción marítima) defined in the
report as sovereign participation on the Pacific coast.
Associated elements of this initiative included freedom
of transit, highway and railway improvement, interoceanic
corridors, port development, and duty free zones. Second,
recognizing the Bolivia-Chile borderland offers interesting
opportunities for cooperation and development, Bolivia
must expand the existing border regime with Chile in areas
such migration, contraband control and water resource
utilization. Third, Bolivia targeted greater economic
complementarity with its neighbor by promoting economic
integration, facilitating and diversifying commercial
exchange and encouraging investment. Finally, the fourth
initiative focused on the need to promote peace and security
on the border. Throughout the report, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs also emphasized that Bolivia's maritime
issue remained essentially trilateral in nature with Peru
a player in any comprehensive settlement.32
In the coming year, the Banzer administration,
led by Foreign Minister Javier Murillo de la Rocha, articulated
the maritime position of Bolivia in a variety of international
forums. Speaking in Caracas in June 1998, for example,
he described Bolivia's landlocked status as an unjust
reality and an obstacle to regional as well as national
economic development. Expanding on these themes in a speech
before the General Assembly of the United Nations in September,
Murillo stressed the enormous economic costs to Bolivia
of being landlocked. Alluding to the various bilateral
negotiations with Chile that had occurred over the years,
the Bolivian foreign minister then concluded with an emphatic
declaration before the General Assembly that Bolivia would
never relinquish its demand for a sovereign presence on
the Pacific Ocean.33
Following the successful conclusion of
a Global and Definitive Peace Agreement with Ecuador
in October 1998, the Peruvian government stated its desire
to resolve with Chile the outstanding issues related to
the 1929 treaty and additional protocol. After a long
year of difficult negotiations, Foreign Ministers Fernando
de Trazegnies of Peru and Juan Gabriel Valdés of Chile
in November 1999 signed a package of documents that collectively
executed the 1929 treaty and additional protocol and ended
70 years of controversy. The Acta de Ejecución
(Act of Execution) addressed the requirement in Article
5 of the 1929 treaty for Chile to construct for Peru a
wharf, customs office, and railway terminal station at
Arica as well as the requirement in Article 2 of the additional
protocol that called for absolute free transit of persons,
merchandise, and armaments to and from Peruvian territory.
It also recognized the right of servitude, as detailed
in Article 5 of the treaty, including its application
to the Tacna and Arica Railway Corporation where it crossed
Chilean territory. In addition, the executing act detailed
the Peruvian administrative bodies with future authority
in Arica. Related documents provided additional details
at the operative level of the pact and addressed potential
areas of future controversy in the administration of the
total agreement.34
Although the resolution of the issues
related to the 1929 treaty and additional protocol was
generally well received in Chile and Peru, a determined
group of Peruvian patriots, mostly resident in and around
Tacna, argued that the details of the settlement were
unfavorable to Peru. Concern was also voiced that the
agreement did not include provision for investment in
the frontier region with Chile similar to the $3 billion
investment package that was an integral part of the 1998
Ecuador-Peru boundary settlement. On the Chilean side,
criticism of the agreement was centered in Arica where
residents worried that its terms would result in Bolivian
cargo being diverted to the Peruvian wharf and thus have
a negative impact on Chilean facilities. The Bolivian
government congratulated both Chile and Peru for concluding
the agreements but also expressed the hope that attention
could now turn to satisfying Bolivian desires for a sovereign
exit to the Pacific Ocean. The overall reaction to the
1999 Acta de Ejecución suggested to many observers
that skepticism might exist in the Tacna-Arica region
as to the practicality of a broader, trilateral settlement
involving a Pacific port for Bolivia.35
Trinational Development
Recently, official and unofficial initiatives
have focused on the economic benefits of increased regional
integration and economic development in southern Peru,
western Bolivia, and northern Chile. Less than two years
ago, a group of diplomats, journalists, and scholars,
many of which had had prior government experience in Bolivia,
Chile or Peru, launched a creative initiative known as
the Proyecto Trinacional or Trinational Project.
The stated objective of the project was the removal of
conceptual and practical obstacles to trinational development
together with the creation of a new agenda for the economic
integration of the region surrounding the Bolivia-Chile-Peru
tripoint.36 The Proyecto Trinacional hoped
to impact on public policy in a variety of interrelated
spheres ranging from the academic to the cultural to the
commercial. Focused on a number of interrelated themes,
with complementarity and mutual benefit at the center,
the effort was sponsored by several well-respected institutions
in Bolivia (Instituto PRISMA, Centro de Estudios Estratégicos
para la Integración Latinoamericana, Universidad Andina
Simón Bolívar), Chile (FLACSO, Corporación Tiempo 2000)
and Peru (Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales,
Programa de Economía de la Universidad Católica Secretaría,
and the Técnica de la Macroregión Sur in Arequipa). The
Proyecto Trinacional organized forums and workshops to
promote both theoretical and practical approaches to trinational
relations and development. It also published in early
2001 a book that highlighted trade and development opportunities
in the region.37
On the official level, a new round of
bilateral talks began in early 2000 when Foreign Minister
Murillo of Bolivia and Foreign Minister Juan Gabriel Valdés
of Chile met in February during the European Union - Group
of Rio summit to discuss an agenda for future negotiations.
Murillo and Gabriel agreed to open a dialogue centered
on six topics: 1) Bolivia's maritime problem, 2) transit
facilities, 3) frontier commissions, 4) port modernization,
5) port privatization, and 6) the integration process.
While Bolivia emphasized that the talks did not constitute
a resumption of diplomatic relations, the Bolivian government
did speak of the need to create a polo de desarrollo
or development zone in the region consisting of southwest
Bolivia, northern Chile and southern Peru. At the same
time, representatives of Bolivia and Chile agreed to propose
to Peru a tripartite formula that could lead to a resolution
of Bolivia's maritime problem.38
Bolivian President Banzer and Chilean
President Ricardo Lagos met in Brasilia in September 2000
and in Panama later in the year. A joint press release
issued following the Brasilia talks reiterated the desire
of both governments to open a dialogue on subjects of
mutual interest, with no exceptions, in an effort to improve
bilateral relations.39 The meeting in Panama
had no formal agenda but included Bolivia's maritime aspirations
together with a trinational perspective for economic development.
The Silala water issue was also discussed. Although press
reports following the meeting described it as successful
in improving relations between the parties, the concrete
results appeared at best rather modest.
To facilitate the export of Bolivian
minerals, Chile agreed to improve and upgrade the road
running from the San Cristóbal Mine in Bolivia to the
Chilean port of Tocopilla. The economic development ministers
of Bolivia and Chile also agreed to meet in January 2001
to discuss joint development in northern Chile and southwestern
Bolivia, and there was mention of a pending proposal to
integrate Peru into the joint development zone. Finally,
the parties agreed to open frontier, duty and police stations
on the border 12 hours daily to maximize vehicular traffic.
At the same time, the Bolivian government felt it necessary
to emphasize that the concessions offered by Chile at
Tocopilla and in other areas were no substitute for the
maritime claims of Bolivia. As the year 2000 closed, Foreign
Minister Murillo admitted that there had been little real
progress on the maritime issue but stressed that the important
thing was to establish and maintain a dialogue with Chile.
He also stated that Bolivia was not interested in reestablishing
diplomatic relations at this time.40
Bolivia-Chile relations in the spring
of 2001 continued to be marked by complex, intertwined
diplomatic and economic issues and initiatives. On the
one hand, Bolivian authorities searched for avenues to
open Chilean markets to Bolivian goods. And the economic
development ministers of Bolivia and Chile met in Santa
Cruz at the end of January 2001 to reaffirm their commitment
to advance economic integration between northern Chile
and western Bolivia. On the other, while a variety of
bilateral commissions continued to work toward this broad
objective, few concrete initiatives, proposals, or projects
were announced. Moreover, Foreign Minister Murillo rightly
expressed grave concern in January 2001 over the pending
sale of F-16 fighter jets to Chile on the grounds the
deal could encourage a regional arms race.41
Presidents Banzer and Lagos again met
in Quebec in April 2001 during the Third Summit of the
Americas. Statements made to the press at the end of the
meeting expressed the commitment of both parties to free
trade and regional integration but also suggested the
long distance to be traveled before a comprehensive settlement,
including improved access to the Pacific, could be reached.
President Lagos expressed the hope that a resumption of
diplomatic relations, a step he described as a logical
political consequence of increased commercial exchange,
could be achieved before the end of his presidential mandate
in the year 2006. President Banzer, on the other hand,
candidly stated that he did not feel he could fulfill,
during his current mandate, Bolivian aspirations for access
to the sea through northern Chile. When compared to the
6-point agenda established by Foreign Ministers Murillo
and Gabriel in February 2000, the Quebec statements implied
only limited progress in selected areas like infrastructure
development and subregional integration and little or
no movement in core issue areas like the Silala waters
dispute and Bolivia's maritime problem. Speaking at ceremonies
marking the anniversary of the birth of the Bolivian Navy,
Admiral Jorge Badani Lenz appeared to summarize accurately
the situation in late April 2001 when he described as
"latent" the Bolivian desire to return to the sea. No
obvious, simple solution to the complex and complicated
maritime issue exists today; nevertheless, the Bolivian
government and people remain determined to improve their
access to the Pacific.42
Observations
Competing commercial, diplomatic and
political interests in Bolivia, Chile and Peru have enjoyed
vastly different dreams for the same space in the Atacama
Desert for almost two centuries. At the outset, the issue
was largely a boundary dispute not unlike a myriad of
similar questions inherited by most Latin American states
at independence. The context of the dispute changed considerably
after 1842 when the discovery of guano, sodium nitrate,
and other minerals in the disputed zone raised serious
issues of economic development as well as regional hegemony.
In the aftermath of the War of the Pacific, geopolitical
considerations tended to dominate the dispute for most
of the next century. Throughout this period, the dispute
remained tripartite in nature and centered on the region
around what is now the Chilean port of Arica.
Today, Bolivia's quest for improved access
to the Pacific continues to restrict bilateral commercial
and diplomatic relations with Chile as well as retarding
regional economic growth and development in western Bolivia,
southern Peru and northern Chile. Until such time as Bolivia
and Chile resume full diplomatic relations, a condition
tied to the maritime question, it will likely remain difficult
for Bolivia, Chile and Peru to develop and implement a
fully integrated development strategy for the region.
In the interim, the challenges of a global economy appear
to be modifying the character and context of the dispute;
and this evolution could offer new opportunities for Bolivia
to fulfill its cherished ambition. Frontiers in the 21st
century increasingly have become less areas of exclusive
space that rigidly define the territorial limits of a
given state and more privileged centers of interstate
complementarity and cooperation. With the decreasing relevance
of national boundaries, frontiers have also become a more
complex and dynamic phenomenon offering fresh opportunities
for well-developed strategies of cross-border integration
and development. Modern concepts of frontiers, through
the promotion of increased commerce and wider economic
growth, thus often improve inter-state relations by encouraging
peace and development in borderlands that in the past
were more often centers of controversy and conflict.43
The five factors most often identified
as important to the success of economic growth triangles
in Asia and elsewhere, economic complementarity, geographical
proximity, political commitment, policy coordination,
and infrastructure largely exist or can be created in
the region surrounding the Bolivia-Chile-Peru tripoint.
And the development of a regional growth triangle, as
part of a broader process designed to address Bolivia's
desire for improved access to the Pacific, would clearly
be of mutual benefit to the subregional economies of the
three parties linked to the question. It would also remove
Bolivia's maritime issue from a zero sum game, in which
one side loses if another gains, and place it within the
context of a new era of trinational cooperation on the
Pacific coast of South America. Enhanced trinational integration
and cooperation thus offers real potential for accelerated
economic development and improved regional well-being
that could eventually satisfy the long-term aspirations
of Bolivia, Chile and Peru in the tripoint region.
Footnotes
1) For a contemporary look at the negative
impact landlocked status has on economic development see
Ricardo Hausmann, "Prisoners of Geography," Foreign
Policy (January/February 2001): 45-53. Hausmann draws
on the Bolivian example to illustrate his argument that
landlocked states are often at a serious disadvantage
in the global economy because of their dependence on agriculture,
restricted access to markets, and limited technological
progress. For a recent Bolivian perspective see "Costo
de la Mediterraneidad de Bolivia Realizado por la Unidad
de Política Económica (UDAPE) dependiente del Ministro
de Hacienda," Discursos del Canciller Javier Murillo
de la Rocha (La Paz: Editorial General, 1999): 31-44.
2) The background to the dispute in the
Atacama Desert is well-known and will only be summarized
here. For more detailed accounts see Ronald Bruce St John,
The Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert,
International Boundaries Research Unit, University of
Durham, Boundary and Territory Briefing 1, 6, (1994) or
Ronald Bruce St John, Boundaries, Trade, and Seaports:
Power Politics in the Atacama Desert, Program in Latin
American Studies Occasional Paper Series No. 28, University
of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1992. For a poignant view
of the crumbling ruins of contemporary Cobija see Ivar
Mendez, "Cobija - Bolivia's first Pacific port," Bolivian
Times (8 March 2001).
3) Foreign consular reports suggest that
the bulk of Bolivian trade as late as the 1850s flowed
through Arica with only a small amount passing through
the Bolivian port of Cobija [J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia:
Land, Location, and Politics since 1825 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972): 50-51].
4) Francisco A. Encina, Las relaciones
entre Chile y Bolivia (1841-1963) (Santiago: Editorial
Nascimento, 1963): 18-21; Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, Historia
Diplomática de Bolivia (Política Internacional), 4th
ed., 2 vols. (Lima: Industrial Gráfica, 1982) I: 97-103.
5) Arturo Jarama, "El Perú y la cuestión
portuaria boliviana en el siglo XIX: Factores de inestabilidad,"
Política Internacional 53 (Julio/Setiembre 1998):
118-137; Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile
and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1965): 24; Alberto Wagner de Reyna, Historia diplomática
del Perú, 2 vols. (Lima: Ediciones Peruanas, 1964)
I: 72. For a copy of the 1826 treaty of limits see Carlos
Ortiz de Zevallos Paz-Soldán, La Misión Ortiz de Zevallos
en Bolivia (1826-1827) Lima: Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores del Perú, 1956): 82-86.
6) Ronald Bruce St John, The Foreign
Policy of Peru (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1992): 35; Paul Gottenberg, Between Silver
and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence
Peru (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979):
69-80; Modesto Basadre y Chocano, Diez Años de historia
política del Perú (1834-1844) (Lima: Editorial Huascarán,
1953): 119-127.
7) Roberto Querejazu Calvo, Guano,
Salitre, Sangre: Historia de la Guerra del Pacífico
(La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro,
1979): 60-65; Richard Snyder Phillips, Jr., "Bolivia in
the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884" (Ph.D. diss., University
of Virginia, 1973): 21-23.
8) Jaime Daniel Rivera Palomino, Geopolítica
y geoeconomía de la Guerra del Pacífico (Ayacucho:
Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1980):
27; Robert Edwards McNicoll, "Peruvian-American Relations
in the Era of the Civilista Party" (Ph.D. diss., Duke
University, 1937): 73; Roberto Querejazu Calvo, La
Guerra del Pacífico (La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial
Los Amigos del Libro, 1983): 109-110 and 116-117.
9) Valentín Abecia, La Dramática Historia
del Mar Boliviana (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud,"
1986): 114-119; Encina, Las relaciones: 157-170;
Burr, By Reason or Force: 140-143 & 160-166.
Copies of the Treaty of Ancón and the Supplementary Protocol
can be found in Perú, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Tratados, Convenciones y Acuerdos vigentes entre el
Peru y otros Estados, 2 vols. (Lima: Imprenta Torres
Aguirre, 1936) I: 165-168.
10) St John, Boundaries, Trade, and
Seaports: 18-19; Querejazu Calvo, La Guerra del
Pacífico: 137-143. For a copy of the 1895 treaties
see Luís Barros Borgoño, La negociación chileno-boliviana
de 1895 (Santiago de Chile: n.p., 1897): 129-135.
11) Emilio Bello C., Perú y Bolivia,
1900-1904 (Santiago de Chile: Moneda, 1919): 187-197;
Oscar Espinosa Moraga, Bolivia y el mar (1810-1964)
(Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1965): 303-306; Luis
Galdames, A History of Chile (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1941): 407-408; Luis
Peñaloza Cordero, Nueva Historia Económica de Bolivia:
La Guerra del Pacífico, 3rd ed., 9 vols.
(La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1984) IV: 341-372.
A copy of the 1904 treaty can be found in William Jefferson
Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute
(Iowa City: University Press, 1927): 232-234.
12) Conrado Rios Gallardo, Chile y
Perú: los pactos de 1929 (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento,
1959): 228-229; Ronald Bruce St John, "The End of Innocence:
Peruvian Foreign Policy and the United States, 1919-1942,"
Journal of Latin American Studies 8, 2 (November
1976): 335; El Diario (La Paz), 10 May 1929.
13) Jorge Gumucio Granier, "Alberto Ostria
y el pacto con el Perú de 1936," Agenda Internacional
IV, 9 (Julio/Diciembre 1997): 97-106; Ronald Bruce St
John, "Hacia el Mar: Bolivia's Quest for a Pacific Port,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs XXXI, 3 (Winter
1977): 68-70; Luis Fernando Guachalla, La cuestión
portuaria y las negociaciones de 1950 (La Paz and
Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1976): 7.
14) The question of compensation became
a major Bolivian issue in talks with Chile in the second
half of the twentieth century. In this regard, it is interesting
to note that the issue was raised by the Bolivian government
as early as 1910. At the time, there was some acceptance
in Bolivia that the Bolivian government should expect
to pay compensation to Chile in exchange for a seaport
on the Pacific.
15) Escobari Cusicanqui, Historia
Diplomática de Bolivia II: 41-44; José Fellmann Velarde,
Memorandum sobre política exterior boliviana, 2nd
ed. (La Paz: Librería Editorial "Juventud," 1967): 81-121
and 146-148; Alejandro Eguren Bresani, "Perú: País Mutilado,"
La Prensa (Lima), 5 October 1968; La Prensa
(Lima), 14 June 1973.
16) Fernando Salazar Paredes, Jorge Gumucio
Granier, Franz Orozco Padilla, and Lorena Salazar Machicado,
Charaña: Una Negociación Boliviana, 1975-1978 (La
Paz: CERID, 2001): 51-62; Douglas H. Shumavon, "Bolivia:
Salida al Mar," in Latin American Foreign Policies:
Global and Regional Dimensions, edited by Elizabeth
G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln (Boulder and London: Westview
Press, 1981): 184.
17) M. I. Glassner. "The Rio Lauca: Dispute
over an International River," Geographical Review
LX (1970): 192-207; Salazar Paredes, et al., Charaña:
62-64; Shumavon, "Bolivia," 185. For a copy of the 8 February
1975 joint declaration, known as the Act of Charaña, see
Salazar Paredes, et al., Charaña: 278-279. For
a copy of the 26 August 1975 Bolivian proposal see Raúl
Botelho Gosalvez, El litoral Boliviano: perspectiva
histórica y geopolítica (Buenos Aires: El Cid Editor,
1980): 93-94.
18) Guillermo Lagos Carmona, Historia
de las Fronteras de Chile: Los tratados de límites con
Bolivia (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1981):
130-131; Salazar Paredes, et al., Charaña: 71-77
and 114-118; Howard T. Pittman, "Chilean Foreign Policy:
The Pragmatic Pursuit of Geopolitical Goals," in The
Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies: Challenges
for the 1980s, edited by Jennie K. Lincoln and Elizabeth
G. Ferris (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984):
133; Shumavon, "Bolivia," 186; Walter Guevara Arze, Radiografía
de la Negociación con Chile (Cochabamba: Editorial
Universo Ltda., 1978): 99-144.
19) José de la Puente Radbill, "La mediterraneidad
de Bolivia," in Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia,
edited by Eduardo Ferrero Costa (Lima: Centro Peruano
de Estudios Internacionales, 1989): 45-53; Stephen M.
Gorman, "Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External
Political and Economic Initiatives," in Latin American
Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions,
edited by Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln (Boulder
and London: Westview Press, 1981): 122-123.
20) Jorge Morelli Pando, Las Hipotecas
Territoriales del Perú (Lima: Fondo Editorial 1995):
131-133; St John, Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in the
Atacama Desert: 21; Escobari Cusicanqui, Historia
diplomática II: 51-53; Lagos Carmona, Historia
de las Fronteras del Chile: 126-132.
21) Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades
Perdidas: Bolivia y el Mar (La Paz and Cochabamba:
Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1987): 69-136; Botelho
Gosalvez, El litoral Boliviano: 143-144; Lagos
Carmona, Historia de las Fronteras del Chile: 132;
Walter Q. Morales, Bolivia: Land of Struggle (Boulder
and London: Westview Press, 1992): 177-178. For a copy
of the Bolivian announcement of the break in diplomatic
relations with Chile see Salazar Paredes, et al., Charaña:
291-294.
22) Ronald Bruce St John and Stephen
M. Gorman, "Challenges to Peruvian Foreign Policy," in
Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation,
edited by Stephen M. Gorman (Boulder: Westview Press,
1982): 187-189; Salazar Paredes, et al., Charaña:
219-230.
23) Ramiro Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia:
La Diplomacia del Mar en la OEA," in Bolivia: Temas
de la Agenda Internacional, edited by Alberto Zelada
Castedo (La Paz: UDAPEX, 2000): 391-394; Walter Q. Morales,
"Bolivian Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Sovereignty,"
in The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies:
Challenges for the 1980s, edited by Jennie K. Lincoln
and Elizabeth G. Ferris (Boulder and London: Westview
Press, 1984): 186-187; Morelli Pando, Hipotecas Territoriales
del Perú: 134-135; Ronald Bruce St John, "Peru: democracy
under siege," The World Today 40, 7 (July 1984):
302.
24) Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores y Culto, Tricolor: Historia y Proyecciones
de Paz, Desarrollo e Integración del Diferendo Marítimo
Boliviano-Chileno (La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial
Los Amigos del Libro, 1988): 7-10, 109-113, 119-126, 155-157.
25) H. Couturier, "Relaciones del Perú
con Chile y Bolivia," in Relaciones Internacionales
del Perú, edited by Eduardo Ferrero Costa (Lima: Centro
Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1986): 45; Morelli
Pando, Hipotecas Territoriales del Perú: 137-139;
Eduardo Ferrero Costa, "Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current
Trends, Constraints and Opportunities," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29, 2 (Summer
1987): 63-66.
26) Morales, Bolivia: 180-181;
Morelli Pando, Hipotecas Territoriales del Perú:
135-137; Presencia (La Paz) 24 March 1990.
27) Ramiro Orias Arredondo, "El Regimen
de los Paises sin Litoral en el Derecho del Mar y las
Perspectivas para Bolivia" (La Paz: Fundemos, 1998):
54-57; Edgar Ergueta Avila, "ILO: Diagnóstico y Proyecciones,"
in Bolivia: Temas de la Agenda Internacional, edited
by Alberto Zelada Castedo (La Paz: UDAPEX, 2000): 93-120;
Alejandro Deustua C., "Los Convenios de Ilo y Su Impacto
Regional," in El Desarrollo del Sur del Perú: Realidad
y desafíos, edited by Drago Kisic and Ramón Bahamonde
(Lima: CEPEI, 1999): 27-37.
28) Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "Las relaciones
actuales del Perú con Chile y Bolivia: Algunas reflexiones,"
in Relaciones del Perú con los paises vecinos,
edited by Eduardo Ferrero Costa (Lima: Centro Peruano
de Estudios Internacionales, 1988): 150-153; J. Brousset
Barrios, "Ejecución de las cláusulas pendientes del tratado
de 1929," in Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia,
edited by Eduardo Ferrero Costa (Lima: Centro Peruano
de Estudios Internacionales, 1989): 97-109.
29) Francisco Tudela, "Entrevista a Francisco
Tudela," Debate XX, 104 (Diciembre-Enero 1998-1999):
15-16; "Lima Conventions Set Aside," IBRU Boundary
and Security Bulletin 4, 2 (Summer 1996): 54-55; Ronald
Bruce St John, "Stalemate in the Atacama," IBRU Boundary
and Security Bulletin 2, 1 (April 1994): 67-68.
30) Alfredo Seoane, Humberto Zambrana,
Fernando Jiménez, and Rafael González, Bolivia y Chile:
complementación económica y asimetrías (La Paz: UDAPEX,
1997): 27-47; St John, Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in
the Atacama Desert: 25.
31) Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia: La Diplomacia
del Mar en la OEA," 399-406.
32) Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores y Culto, Las Relaciones Boliviano-Chilenas:
Diagnóstico y Perspectivas, 30 July 1997, mimeograph;
Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia," 401-405; Alfredo Seoane, et
al., Bolivia y Chile: 27-47.
33) Javier Murillo de la Rocha, Discursos
del Canciller Javier Murillo de la Rocha (La Paz:
Editorial General, 1999): 1-19.
34) Acta de Ejecución (13 November
1999), Reglamento del Acto de Ejecución (13 November
1999), and Acuerdo Interinstitucional sobre Solución
de Controversias (13 November 1999), mimeograph copies;
Ronald Bruce St John, "Chile and Peru: The Final Settlement,"
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 8, 1 (Spring
2000): 91-100; Fabian Novak Talavera, Las Conversaciones
entre Perú y Chile para la Ejecución del Tratado de 1929
(Lima: Fondo Editorial, 2000).
35) Alejandro Deustua C. "Amaos Los Unos
y los Rotos," Caretas 1595 (25 November 1999);
El Comercio (Lima) 13 November 1999 and 14 November
1999; El Diario (La Paz) 12 November 1999 and 13
November 1999; El Mercurio (Santiago de Chile)
12 November 1999.
36) Allan Wagner, a former foreign minister
of Peru and an active participant in the Proyecto Trinacional,
recently called for Bolivia, Chile and Peru to move to
a dynamic of cooperation and integration. He argued that
trinational cooperation could become a motor for economic
development and regional well-being that could facilitate
a solution to Bolivia's maritime problem. Allan Wagner
Tizón, "Comentarios," in El Desarrollo del Sur del
Perú: Realidad y desafíos, edited by Drago Kisic and
Ramón Bahamonde (Lima: CEPEI, 1999): 135-137.
37) Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia," 405-410;
"El mar será negociado cuando se despejen celosdes y confianzas,"
La Razón (La Paz) 3 April 2001; Proyecto Trinacional
de Desarrollo Integrado del Norte de Chile, el Sur del
Perú y el Occidente de Bolivia, 4 July 2000, mimeograph.
On the output of the Proyecto Trinacional see Antonio
Araníbar Quiroga, et al., Hacia un enfoque trinacional
de las relaciones entre Bolivia, Chile y Peru (La
Paz: Plural Editores, 2001).
38) El Diario (La Paz) 1 February
2000, 22 February 2000, and 24 February 2000, internet
edition.
39) "Comunicado de Prensa Conjunto Bolivia-Chile,"
Brasilia, 1 September 2000, mimeograph.
40) El Diario (La Paz) 17 November
2000, 18 November 2000, and 24 November 2000; La Razón
(La Paz) 18 November 2000; Los Tiempos (Cochabamba)
18 November 2000, 21 November 2000, and 22 December 2000,
internet editions.
41) Christopher Marquis, U.S. Preparing
to End Ban and Approve Sale of F-16's to Chile," The
New York Times 10 January 2001; El Diario (La
Paz) 30 January 2001, internet edition.
42) El Diario (La Paz) 22 April
2001, internet edition; Mario Ojara Agreda, "Construir
el País marítimo," El Diario (La Paz) 22 March
2001; Juvenal Canedo Chávez, "Problema de Bolivia: el
mar," El Diario (La Paz) 3 April 2001; Los Tiempos
(Cochabamba) 22 April 2001, internet edition; "Mantenemos
latente el deseo de retornar al mar," El Diario
(La Paz) 24 April 2001; Kenneth Mendoza, "La reunión cumbre
del ALCA y el tema de mar para Bolivia," El Diario
(La Paz) 25 April 2001, internet edition.
43) On the changing concept of borders
in Latin America see Jorge Valdez Carrillo, "El Sur del
Perú en la estrategia nacional de desarrollo fronterizo,"
in El Desarrollo del Sur del Perú: Realidad y desafíos,
edited by Drago Kisic and Ramón Bahamonde (Lima: CEPEI,
1999): 157-158.
About the Author
Ronald Bruce St John holds a B.A. in
political science from Knox College and an M.A. and Ph.D.
in international relations from the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver. He first
visited Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in 1968 and has been
a regular commentator on Andean affairs since that time.
Recent publications include La Política Exterior del
Perú (Lima, 1999), "Chile, Peru and the Treaty of
1929: The Final Settlement" in IBRU Boundary and Security
Bulletin (Spring 2000), "Triángulos, Puertos, y Tratados"
in Hacia un enfoque trinacional de las relaciones entre
Bolivia, Chile y Peru (La Paz, 2001).
[ table
of contents ]
El
joven Boreby
Jesús Urzagasti
Boreby es una voz guaraní con que se
designa al tapir (llamado también anta o alce). Me parece
bella y más enigmática que sus equivalentes en idioma
castellano. La escuché desde muy temprano asociada al
río, a los incendios o al rojizo atardecer, y la trajiné
con la intención de usarla como se debe en algún momento.
Ni sospechaba que la ocasión se daría en una casa en plena
construcción -en la ciudad de La Paz- donde conviven Pinky,
una lasye de buen pelo e intachable comportamiento, y
Lobo, un abuelo recogido de la calle que al cabo de unos
años recuperó su peso y volvió a confiar en sus semejantes.
De tanto en tanto, Pinky suele parir
una media docena de cachorros que van a dar a casas de
vecinos o de meros desconocidos, en calidad de regalos.
Entre la penúltima tongada de crías llegó uno bastante
menudo y que se demoró más de la cuenta en abrir los ojos
y mirar el mundo. A ése lo aparté, por puro instinto,
por cariño preliminar o por afecto a primera vista. Se
fueron todos, menos él, que quedó retozando bajo el nombre
de Boreby, como hijo de Pinky y nieto adoptivo de Lobo.
Su pelo es menos fino que el de su madre, pero del mismo
color castaño, que contrasta con el negro reluciente de
su abuelo.
Meses después, Boreby dejó de llorar
y dejó también de inmiscuirse en los asuntos de su madre,
salvo a título de camarada menor, jovial y pendenciero
durante el día y de oído alerta en las noches. Aunque
al comienzo su relación con Lobo estuvo marcada por la
insolencia propia de su edad, muy pronto empezó a prodigarle
el respeto que merecen los ancianos. Y así, Boreby, edipillo
en ciernes, ganó en independencia, porque algo le advirtió
que debía orinar como hombre mayor, puesto que estaba
de cuatro patas en el umbral de los adultos.
Cuando después de la medianoche pasan
atropellándose sombras y voces, Pinky duerme a pierna
suelta, y Lobo se considera chicato y sordo sin remedio,
en consecuencia, no presta atención a esos fugitivos seres.
El único alzado en armas es Boreby que en lugar de ladrar,
como hacía en sus horas de principiante, aguza los oídos
y descifra con la mirada y el olfato el misterioso tránsito
y las no menos misteriosas voces. Uno puede dormirse,
pero Boreby sigue velando y es probable que merced a su
oficio de guardián hubiera aprendido a reconocer todas
las figuras que descienden y suben por la calle: los tullidos,
los graduados en ciencias económicas, los borrachos, los
políticos, los recién llegados de lejanas comarcas, los
banqueros, los afligidos y los estudiantes de Física,
inconfundibles incluso para un perro llamado Boreby.
Al día siguiente, Boreby es el primero
en dar vueltas por el patio, con renovado vigor y torpeza,
impropios de una Pinky o de un Lobo, por educación en
la primera, y por experiencia en el segundo. En el caso
de Boreby prevalece, ante todo, un mundo inhóspito, resabio
de otras edades y de otros desiertos, sin que por ello
sea indiferente al afecto que le demuestran los propietarios
del edificio a medio construir. Lo empuja, pues, la memoria
de su especie, y lo detiene el mundo civilizado, donde
morder no es un delito, siempre que el individuo mordedor
no sea el perro. Konrad Lorenz, una eminencia en la etología,
hubiese considerado a Boreby un ejemplar típico del perro
salvaje que vacila entre sus instintos y la inteligencia
que conviene acumular para no sobresaltarse o tronar entre
los hombres. Supongo que por eso Boreby juega durante
el día y es, también, un melancólico nocherniego, porque
para él las voces de las sombras y del viento no son nimiedades,
sino la envoltura fatal del misterio que otros llaman
porvenir.
Visita intempestiva
El hombre estaba soñando, por eso mucho
de lo que escuchó se le esfumó cuando retornó a la vigilia,
salvo la figura de un caminante y el acento de su voz.
Le dijo como al desgaire:
-Mientras menos tengas, más estarás dando
a tu prójimo. Sólo así podrás tener. ¿Paradoja? Paradoja
o parábola, escúchala: Si tu prójimo no tiene nada, tú
de veras no tendrás nada. Nadie tendrá nada y el mundo
se habrá empobrecido.
Para unos es fácil acumular fortunas,
para otros es difícil escapar de la pobreza. En ambos
casos, el sufrimiento es un visitante muy asiduo. ¿Qué
harás con el sufrimiento? No lo ahuyentes, no le eches
aceite hirviendo, trátalo como quisieras ser recibido
al cabo de una larga travesía. Porque el sufrimiento viene
de muy lejos y sólo espera un gesto amistoso para revelar
su verdadera naturaleza. El tiempo gira y canta entre
la arboleda cuando todos duermen y el insomne sueña. Pero
tú -como cualquiera- eres de carne y hueso y estás destinado
al invierno y a la luminosidad. A cada quien le espera
su viento triste al atardecer, a cada quien le toca recordar
aquellos caminos que prometían el cielo y la tierra.
Si no sabes mirar a un niño potosino,
perderás el tiempo sacándote la lotería. Si no sabes adivinar
la historia de tu vecino -presentir su centro secreto
-, tarde o temprano la vida te pedirá cuentas por haberte
dado un oficio que lo convertiste en simple título. Tendré
pinta de predicador, pero no lo soy. Mira a aquel hombre
que viene de la punta del cerro, ¿tú crees que es un predicador?
Allá tú si por esos rumbos van tus conjeturas. Nada raro
que al pasar por tu lado te diga "en cada semilla se esconde
un arbusto, en cada arbusto una flor, en cada flor una
semilla y en cada semilla miles de semillas, siempre y
cuando la semilla sepa ser semilla". Ruega en la vigilia
que pase por tu lado cuando estés soñando.
De lo contrario, mejor ni duermas. Si
mal no recuerdo, habíamos quedado en que era difícil pensar
en los demás. ¡Cuánto más difícil es sentir en los demás
y sentir por los demás! Tú no eres santo, los demás tampoco
lo son. Pero si escribes una carta que sea para averiguar
las razones por las que hay un tiempo de oro y un país
de oro; quizás cuando cierres el sobre estarás allí donde
querías estar, en la región que moran las personas que
desean recibir una carta de un ser que sueña con la inestable
realidad. Si tienes miedo, está bien. Y si no lo vences,
está mal. Es más fácil acrecentar la riqueza heredada
que administrar un capital tan valioso como el miedo.
Pues el que llega a saber qué cosa es el miedo, queda
en la calle, o sea en el comienzo del camino verdadero.
Yo canté contigo y con tus amigos, canté con todo el mundo
en jornadas engañosamente memorables.
-¿Es malo cantar? -me preguntó el incrédulo.
-Si no tienes penas que cantar, al menos aprende a rebuznar
-le contesté. ¿Qué otra cosa podría haberle dicho? Yo
soy el que baja de la punta del cerro. Ojalá pase por
tu lado y te diga: "Te reconocí porque alguna vez me has
soñado".
Rememoración
En el Día de los difuntos recordaré a
Laura. No al conflictivo personaje de uno de los cuentos
de Oscar Cerruto. Tampoco a Laura Bauer, la guerrillera
que murió en Vado del Yeso, recuperada en un hermosísimo
poema por la argentina Susana Molina. La Laura de los
difuntos días de mi infancia apareció por la casa y se
quedó allí dos semanas, un mes, no lo sé. Solía vivir
con su madre en Campo Grande en una casa de barro cubierta
de grandes árboles; en noches de surazo el jacarandá y
la granadilla producían melodías tristes y repentinas
como una revelación. Para el caminante, por supuesto.
Laura no hizo nada especial en la vida
-tampoco le hacía falta-, salvo sonreir con una ternura
sin nombre debajo del guaranguay, y morirse a sus veinte
años en una provincia argentina. Con su falda de franela
y su blusa de tartán. Y sus ojos, que se llevaron imágenes
que vuelven en los ojos delos enamorados.
Nada especial. Pero es una persona muerta.
Y con el primer muerto se configura un mapa para orientarse
en el mundo de los vivos. Porque los seres vivientes rara
vez sirven de brújula, con frecuencia estorban y, por
lo demás, están privados de la serena mirada de los difuntos.
En cambio con los muertos el mundo cobra relieve entrañable.
Los geranios serían distintos si no los recordaran los
muertos. Y la luna fosforescente sería un metal distante,
inocuo, si no la alimentaran los sueños de los muertos.
Y un país es rumoroso e inolvidable porque
lo habitan los muertos. Los muertos no le temen a nada.
Ni a la muerte ni a la oscuridad. Menos a las balas. Será
porque tienen la manía de retornar a la tierra a través
de los sueños de los hombres. Tantos muertos para que
el lenguaje no se degrade. Tantos difuntos para la bienhechora
soledad del solidario.
Tanta multitud de olvidados: los que
perdieron la vida en noviembre de 1979. Marcelo Quiroga
Santa Cruz, Pompilio Guerrero, Sergio Almaraz, Adrián,
Froilán Tejerina. Tantos otros. El gordo y el infantil,
haciendo fácil lo difícil de la retentiva.
El que decía distiribintincuadriculada
sin tartamudear y lo fajaron en la Plaza Murillo. Y el
que prefirió morir sin transar con los muertos en vida.
Y el que está a punto de morir, merecedor de la revelación
que la vida no comunica. El que no conoció a Laura y,
sin embargo, transita con ella en una geografía de sombras.
Transparentes e incógnitos. Despojados de aniversarios
y con luciérnagas en los huesos de las manos.
El sueño de Mars Observer
Mars Observer es una sonda espacial construida
por los estadounidenses para echarle un vistazo a Marte.
Tras arduas jornadas, los científicos de la Administración
Nacional de Aeronáutica y el Espacio (NASA) pusieron en
vereda a Mars Observer y la largaron al cielo con una
misión precisa: mirar a Marte de atrás y de adelante,
fotografiarlo de abajo y de arriba. Mars Observer no llevaba
una pinche cámara: con ella podía captar un Vokswagen
desde una altura de 375 kilómetros. Es de suponer que
en Marte hay cosas más dignas de la curiosidad de una
sonda espacial. Mientras la construían, la nave especial
no decía ni pío. Pero en cuanto tuvo la certeza de que
una alta ingeniería la había provisto de una conciencia
que podía diferenciar los planes de la NASA de los suyos,
encontró que una cosa es ser chatarra en el planeta Tierra
y otra muy distinta una reluciente sonda en los espacios
estelares.
Preparó sus élitros, removió sus innumerables
datos computarizados y emprendió un vuelo que todos creyeron
triunfal, y en verdad lo era, pues desde que recibió el
biberón en la cuna Mars Observer vivió obsesionada con
la idea de otear el horizonte definitivo, el del infinito.
Entre construirla y amaestrarla para una delicada misión,
la NASA había gastado mil millones de dólares, suma que
no es ningún chiste incluso para los gringos, aunque para
una nave espacial sea una bicoca, pues una sonda es eso:
un hermoso ser que realiza el sueño humano de volar más
allá de los dominios de la imaginación. En lugar de dar
vueltas en torno a Marte, Mars Observer sintió la tentación
de escabullirse, atraída por misterios de los que no tienen
la menor idea los científicos de la NASA.
-¡Qué Marte ni ocho cuartos! -dijo Mars
Observer luego de sacar una fotografía de la Tierra para
guardarla como precioso recuerdo del planeta donde fue
construida.
Mientras la sonda espacial enfilaba hacia
la boca del infinito, Arden Albes -jefe del proyecto de
la NASA- gritó: "¡Es terrible! Desde el sábado no sabemos
nada de ella; ayer no se comunicó con la torre de control,
como aseguró que lo haría. ¿Habrá disparado sus propulsores
para situarse en la órbita de Marte? ¡Ojalá no cometa
la locura de permanecer en silencio!"
-¡Qué Marte ni carabina de Ambrosio!
-repitió Mars Observer mientras tomaba mil fotografías
de la Tierra y acometía finalmente una tarea que Arden
Albes, en Pasadena, no había previsto: la exploración
del universo por cuenta propia, en un vuelo por primera
vez autónomo y con el aliento de la eternidad.
[ table
of contents ]
El
Libro En Manos Del Analfabeto
Jesús Urzagasti
Se ha dicho hace rato que los días del
libro están contados. Vaticinio que ha llevado a muchos
a elogiarlo como si se tratara de un difunto, y a otros
a practicar sin recato la omisión de la lectura. En lugar
de enemistarse con esas voces agoreras, habrá que preguntarse
por qué se piensa que el libro va a desaparecer. Obviamente,
porque quien lo ha defendido a troche y moche -el lector-
ya no está dispuesto a oficiar de sobreviviente en un
mundo ido. Sus razones tendrá ese vago individuo, a veces
multitudinario, que solía descifrar los enigmáticos universos
de la novela y de la poesía sin otra exigencia que la
del placer prometido. Ya no es el irreverente asiduo de
las librerías y su memoria se nutre de otros datos, quizás
profanos, pero que al fin de cuentas lo mantienen en correspondencia
con los principios de simpatía que dan sentido a la vida.
Ese individuo está en todas partes y
en ninguna, como ocurre con quienes han hecho de su descreímiento
una suerte de omnipotencia. Habrá, pues, que recuperar
al lector, incluso si es un analfabeto. Y habrá que recobrarlo
con sus mismas armas, devolviéndolo a la recámara de la
cultura para que las fulgurantes metáforas de la vida
hallen eco en su memoria. Porque el lector es eso: organismo
entrenado para la ficción y que la echa de menos cuando
la escritura degenera y se empobrece. Y es también un
enigma: basta verlo cruzar puentes, trepar escaleras,
descender hacia los anchos ríos y desaparecer en la boca
de la noche. Y es suficiente observarlo en su oficio más
peligroso para convencernos del rigor de su imaginación
y de su ingenuo apego a las palabras. Porque sólo así
podría continuar siendo lo que siempre fue: un devoto
usuario de libros aún no escritos.
En escenarios donde manda el perfil sereno
de las estadísticas se ha asegurado que la circulación
del libro está restringida por la esmirriada economía
del gran público. En otras palabras, no se lee o se lee
menos que antes porque las publicaciones son caras. Eso
es cierto, como lo saben aquellos que oficiando de piratas
obligan al descenso de los costos y se hacen de un botín
en complicidad con los lectores de escasos recursos.
Semejante paradoja es intolerable para
los editores que creen en la ley y creen también en las
ganancias que las normas establecidas permiten. Con todo,
quizás una de las causas del desaliento casi generalizado
estriba en el hecho de que el lector ha sido llevado a
un escenario en donde la utopía no cuenta. O es de uso
restringido y va encapsulada en una módica locura. El
libro de pronto es mera mercancía: viene con el prestigio
del antiguo hechizo de la lectura pero pierde el aliento
y se desmorona entre tantos intermediarios, fríos y desconocidos.
Eso es grave si aceptamos que la literatura es, ante todo,
utopía: a cada instante está inoculando más realidad al
mundo por la vía de la ficción. Tal vez convenga recalcar
algo que todo el mundo sabe en materia de circulación
de libros: en esta época abundan los instrumentos para
garantizar la masiva llegada de publicaciones a todos
los rincones de nuestros países.
Hay dinero, las editoriales lucen un
subido interés por los escritores, incluidos los incomprendidos
e influidos, la cultura -precisamente porque se ha tornada
inofensiva- merece las consideraciones propias de su jerarquía.
Lo único que falta para completar el milagro es que el
precio de los libros esté a tono con los salarios de las
mayorías. Semejante milagro no ocurre en mi país, Bolivia.
Y me temo que, con ligeras variantes, algo pareci |